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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The front caption contains all of the parties to the appeal; (however, Pulmonetic Systems,
Inc., a Delaware Corporation, who manufactured the ventilator at issue in this case, was
also named as a defendant and was a party to the proceedings before the trial court.
Pulmonetic settled with Mr. Nguyen, and it is no longer a £arty to this case.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue I. Mr. Nguyen designated Dr. John Goldenring, a general pediatrician with no
experience as a critical care attending physician, as his expert witness. Defendants are
University of Utah Hospitals and clinics, who employed Madeline Witte, M.D. a critical
care physician with sub-specialties in critical care medicin^ and pulmonary medicine and
members of Primary Children's Medical Center's staff included in its pediatric intensive
care unit. Did the trial court properly exclude plaintiffs eicDert because he lacked
qualifications to establish the applicable standard of care f<|)r different schools of
medicine?
Issue II. Dr. Goldenring did not review or understand thelmedical condition of Derek,
the hospital's policies, or the factors that went into Dr. Wijte's decision to transport
Derek for a CT scan. Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Eviddnce requires expert testimony
to be grounded in reliable facts and data in order to be admissible. Were Dr.
Goldenring's opinions properly excluded under Rule 702 because he lacked the requisite
factual basis in which to render a reliable opinion that woi|ld assist the trier of fact?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Dikeou\v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Stevensen v. Goodson, 924|P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996).
Moreover, "[t]he trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the
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admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this
court will not reverse." Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996).
Issue III. A hospital is not required to obtain informed consent to use FDA-approved
medical devices in the course of treating a patient. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Witte did not
obtain informed consent to use the FDA-approved Pulmonetic ventilator in her attempts
to save Derek Nguyen's life. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment on plaintiffs informed consent claim.
Issue IV. Utah law requires intentional outrageous and intolerable conduct for claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff failed to allege sufficiently
intentional or outrageous conduct to support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress or for an award of punitive damages. Did the trial court properly grant
summary judgment on plaintiffs claims?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the
appellate court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993).
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the
appellate court grants no deference to the trial courf s legal conclusions and reviews them
for correctness. See Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d
356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4102(2)0).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUSES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
(a) Subject to the limitation in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify theretp in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specified knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying the
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of
facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally
accepted by the relevant expert community.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff Buu Nguyen (Mr. Nguyen) filed this products liability and medical
malpractice action alleging the Pulmonetic ventilator was defective and alleging that the
University of Utah and Primary Children's Medical Center (PCMC) breached the
standard of care owed to Derek Nguyen (Derek), resulting in his death. Pulmonetic
settled with Mr. Nguyen and is no longer a party to this action.
In order to establish the applicable standard of care, breach of that standard, and
causation, Mr. Nguyen designated Dr. Goldenring as an expert witness. The University
and PCMC moved to strike Dr. Goldenring's opinions under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence. Specifically, Dr. Goldenring lacked the qualifications necessary to opine
about the standards of care applicable to Dr. Witte, a pediatrician with board
certifications in critical care and pulmonary care, and to the PICU staff of PCMC. In
addition, Dr. Goldenring lacked the qualifications to offer opinions about a hospital's
protocols regarding its decision to purchase a new medical device. Moreover, Dr.
Goldenring's lack of qualifications prevented him from considering and understanding
the facts that led to the decision to use the Pulmonetic ventilator to transport Derrick for a
CT scan. After the trial court granted the motion to strike Dr. Goldenring's opinions,
both parties moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Nguyen could not
establish a prima facie case against them without expert testimony. These motions for
summary judgment were granted, and this appeal followed.
4

Based on the number of claims that Mr. Nguyen h b asserted, he needed expert
testimony to establish the applicable standard of care for e^ch individual or entity. The
University of Utah will address the facts and law with respect to Dr. Witte. PCMC will
address the facts and law with respect to its staff and its protocols for evaluating medical
devices. Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appelate Procedure, PCMC adopts
and incorporates by reference the facts and arguments set fprth in the University of
Utah's brief. In support of the issues set forth in this brief,! PCMC sets forth the
following facts:
Facts
In 2001, Primary Children's Medical Center was cobsidering two different FDAapproved transportable ventilators for use in its Life Flight transport program. (R. at 90122, 961, 982-83, 1008-09, 1013-14) PCMC was deciding jvhether to purchase a
Pulmonetic transportable ventilator or a Cross Vent transportable ventilator. (R. at 987)
For any new medical device, PCMC has a rigorous Clinical Technology Management
("CTM") process it uses to determine which medical device it will purchase. (R. at 90122, 1008-10, 1013-14) Although PCMC independently nerforms an electrical safety
inspection of medical devices, it relies on the device manufacturer and FDA approval to
certify the device operates properly. (R. at 1008-10, 1013-^4, 1242, 1914-16, 2026) The
FDA had approved both ventilators for use in hospitals and hospital transports.
PCMC has developed its CTM process in order to Evaluate medical devices that it
is considering for purchase and to ensure a thorough and upoiased evaluation of the
device. (R. at 901-22, 961, 982-83, 1008-09, 1013-14) Th^ CTM process is broader than

an initial evaluation of a medical device, and it includes a comprehensive evaluation of a
device's life cycle. (R. at 1982, 2016, 3232) Indeed, PCMC's committee includes both
health care providers and non-health care providers, such as clinical engineers and
finance personnel. (R. at 787, 1983-86, 3241-43, 3249-54)
Although broad in its scope and purpose, the CTM process does not prescribe
what medical situations or patients warrant using a particular device or the when its
physicians or staff may use a particular medical device; rather, the medical professional
determines, based on the medical needs of a patient, which device needs to be used to
provide appropriate medical care. (R. at 901-22, 961, 982-84) A patient's attending
physician, in this case Dr. Witte, is responsible for assessing a patient's condition and
then ordering the appropriate medical care, which may include the use of a particular
device. (R. at 987) As Derek's attending physician, Dr. Witte had ultimate responsibility
for making the decisions regarding his medical care. (R. at 988)
On November 24, 2001, Derek Nguyen was admitted to the Pediatric Intensive
Care Unit (PICU) at PCMC with serious injuries from a motor vehicle accident, including
a fractured skull, a degloving scalp laceration, multi-organ failure, brain injury, and
lacerations of his intraabdominal organs. (R. at 1000-02) As Derek's attending physician
at PCMC, Dr. Witte was responsible for making decisions about Derek's treatment and
care. (R. at 987-88) Dr. Witte, however, is not an employee of IHC Health Services or
Primary Children's Medical Center. (R. at 981-83)
Because Derek's condition was not improving, and had in fact worsened, Dr.
Witte ordered a CT scan to assess Derek's ongoing problems with intracranial
6

hypertension and cerebral profusion pressure. (R. at 987, 991-92, 997) Dr. Witte
believed that obtaining a CT was critical and that there wai a high likelihood that Derek
would die if nothing was done to address his deteriorating condition. (R. at 998-99)
Accordingly, Dr. Witte ordered that the Pulmonetic ventilator be used to transport Derek
Nguyen to the CT scanner because it offered a pressure control mode of ventilation and
could deliver the support that Derek required. (R. at 986, 9^5-96) In so doing, Dr. Witte
was cognizant that the Pulmonetic ventilator was in PCMCj because it was one of two
ventilators being considered for purchase. (R. at 792) Dr. Witte's decision to use the
Pulmonetic ventilator, however, was made outside of the GTM process to access the
Pulmonetic ventilator and was based on two emergent ci
circumstances: (1) Derek's
deteriorating condition and her need for more information to treat him (R. at 792), and (2)
the Pulmonetic ventilator was the only ventilator available at PCMC that was mobile and
could provide a high pressure setting that Derek required. (R. at 792, 986, 995-99) In
fact, Kevin Crezee, R.R.T., the respiratory therapist who assisted in transporting Derek
Nguyen, under Dr. Witte's direction, stated that the Pulmonetic ventilator was the only
available ventilator that could duplicate the respiratory support Derek was receiving at
bedside during transport. (R. at 1017, 1023)
Before Derek was transported to the CT scanner, he was placed on the Pulmonetic
ventilator for approximately an hour to ensure that the ventilator would provide Derek
with the requisite levels of support. (R. at 984-85, 1003) While Derek was on the
Pulmonetic ventilator prior to transport, PCMC's staff determined the ventilator was
providing comparable pressures to sustain Derek and performed blood gas tests to
7

determine the ventilator was providing the desired levels of oxygen saturation. (R. at 98485, 1003) Derek was then transported to the CT scan using the Pulmonetic ventilator
and had a CT scan without incident. On the way back to the PICU, the Pulmonetic
ventilator unexpectedly shut down, and Kevin Crezee immediately began manual
ventilation with the resuscitation bag. Attempts to resuscitate Derek failed, and he died
from multiple organ failure, heart failure, and respiratory failure. (R. at 1022)
After Derek's death, Pulmonetic investigated the cause of its ventilator's
unexpected malfunction. (R. at 824-27) The Pulmonetic investigation did not indicate the
ventilator had been misused by Dr. Witte or PCMC. (R. at 824-27) To the contrary, the
investigation revealed an unforeseeable product defect in the ventilator, which caused it
to suddenly short circuit and lose power. (R. at 824-27)
Mr. Nguyen's Expert Witness, Dr. John Goldenring
Mr. Nguyen settled his product liability claim against Pulmonetic, and he
designated Dr. John Goldenring as his expert witness for his medical malpractice claims
against all remaining defendants in this matter, including the University, PCMC, and
PCMC's staff. (R. at 1025-29)
Dr. Goldenring attempted to demonstrate his qualifications as to each defendant
through his education and experience. Because Dr. Goldenring was Mr. Nguyen's only
expert witness., Dr. Goldenring was required to demonstrate knowledge and experience in
the following areas: a critical care attending pediatric physician with the requisite board
certifications in critical care medicine and pulmonary medicine, a PICU nurse, a PICU
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respiratory therapist, and a hospital administrator with knowledge of the development and
implementation of hospital CTM processes.
After graduating from medical school, Dr. Goldenring completed his residency in
pediatrics and a fellowship in adolescent medicine, treating patients from ages 9 to 25.
(R. at 1040-41) Since approximately 1994, Dr. Goldenring primarily worked primarily in
the capacity of medical director for Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMO") or
Independent Practice Associations ("IPA"). (R. at 1042-47) Dr. Goldenring testified that
he has never been a hospital administrator. (R. at 1048) Instead, Dr. Goldenring merely
interacts with hospital administrators in his capacity as an IflMO or IPA medical director.
As an HMO and IPA medical director, Dr. Goldenring testified that he maintains
contracts with hospitals, which includes monitoring hospitals to insure that the hospitals
are following the policies and procedures required by the l^MO or IPA. (R. at 1048-49)
In his administrative capacity, however, Dr. Goldeniing has never been involved
with the evaluation of equipment in a facility like PCMC. (JR. at 1052) Furthermore, Dr.
Goldenring has never written protocols for clinical technology evaluations in a facility
similar to PCMC. (R. at 1025) With respect to PCMC's evaluation of transport
ventilators, Dr. Goldenring acknowledged that he not a ventilator expert and has never
used the particular Pulmonetic ventilator model that is at ls^ue in this matter. (R. at 103536)
As to the medical professionals who attended to Der^k while he was in the PICU,
Dr. Goldenring attempted to establish a requisite level of training and experience. Dr.
9

Goldenring is not board certified in critical care medicine and acknowledges that "it is
not appropriate for a general pediatrician to take on a really bad case . . . without getting
lots of help," including help from critical care physicians. (R. at 1034, 1048). In addition,
Dr. Goldenring also testified that he would defer to a respiratory therapist regarding the
standard of care applicable to respiratory therapists. (R. at 1059-60) Dr. Goldenring
testified that he did not know if it was a breach of the standard of care for a respiratory
therapist to follow Dr. Witte's order to use the Pulmonetic ventilator. (R. at 1058)
Finally, Dr. Goldenring testified that he is not an expert regarding the standard of care
applicable to nurses and would defer to a nursing expert regarding the applicable standard
of care. (R. at 1060)
Notwithstanding his lack of qualifications, Dr. Goldenring testified that PCMC
breached the standard of care in its treatment of Derek from an administrative standpoint
by not following its own policies and procedures. (R. at 1051, 1053) In fact, Dr.
Goldenring testified to the following regarding the PCMC's alleged breach of the
applicable standard of care:
[T]he hospital has protocols and policies and procedure that they
need to see are enforced and that their employees and/or people
working at the hospital need to follow. Insofar as they don't, then the
hospital is also responsible in addition to the people who violate the
protocols.
(R. at 1061) Dr. Goldenring's primary criticism was that the Pulmonetic ventilator
should not be used on critically ill patients because the CTM protocol suggested
the process should focus on moderately ill patients. Dr. Goldenring testified,
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however, that he was unaware of any written protocol, policy, or procedure that
limited the patient population for clinical evaluation to moderately ill, stable
patients. (R. at 1054-57) In fact, Dr. Goldenring admitted that he had never read
PCMC's protocol governing the procedure PCMC used to Evaluate the Pulmonetic
ventilator. (R. at 1053-54)
Nonetheless, Dr. Goldenring's opinion was that PCMC established its own CTM
process, and it should be held to this process. (R. at 1053). In so doing, Dr. Goldenring,
however, was not critical of the process that PCMC had deVeloped. (R. at 1053-54). Dr.
Goldenring described PCMC's CTM process as "extremely detailed" and "good." (R. at
1053). In addition, Dr. Goldenring had no criticism of the 0are Derek received prior to
being transported for a CT scan. (R. at 843) Dr. Goldenring admitted the care provided
to Derek was excellent, and without it, he likely would hav^ died. (R. at 843)
Furthermore, with respect to its CTM process, he stated: "IJPCMC] had gone through a
very good and extensive process and I think it's laudable." (R. at 1054). Finally, Dr.
Goldenring could not point to any PCMC policies which lirjnited the patient population
for the Pulmonetic ventilator. (R. at 1054-57)
The undisputed testimony regarding the decision to ilise the Pulmonetic ventilator
to transport Derek did not support Dr. Goldenring's opinions that the CTM guidelines
established the applicable standard of care for Derek's treatment. First, Dr. Witte
unequivocally testified that her decision to use the ventilato^: was outside of the CTM
Process. (R. at 792) Dr. Witte consulted with other health cjare providers regarding
11

Derek's treatment and ultimately made the decision that a CT scan was necessary in order
to get more information to treat Derek. (R. at 794). As Derek's attending physician, Dr.
Witte had the ultimate authority to decide the appropriate course of treatment. (R. at 794)
In making this decision, Dr. Witte stated that PCMC has no general policies that prohibit
using medical devices on certain patients. (R. at 793) It is the attending physician's call
to determine the course of treatment and what devices are needed to execute that course
of treatment. (R. at 794) Finally, Dr. Witte understood that the CTM process
contemplated use of the transportable ventilators on moderately ill children but that
criteria was established because those are the kinds of patients that the Life Flight team
would most commonly encounter. (R. at 800) The CTM process did not eliminate
critically ill children because of some perceived risk to those patients, rather the CTM
process selected the patient population on whom the device was most likely used. (R. at
800)
Procedural Details of Case and Disposition of the case below
PCMC joins in the University's recitation of the procedural details and
disposition of the case below.

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Dr. Goldenring lacks the necessary qualifications io render a reliable expert
opinion to establish the standard of care applicable to PCMC and its staff. Because Dr.
Goldenring lacks the necessary qualifications, his opinionsl fail to comprehend the factual
predicate for the medical decisions that he criticizes. Dr. 0oldenring admitted he did not
fully understand Derek's medical condition or how he was trending while in the PICU.
Indeed, Dr. Goldenring did not really comprehend Derek's [condition in the PICU.
Instead, Dr. Goldenring admitted that Derek's care up until] the time the decision was
made to transport him was excellent.
Because Dr. Goldenring did not review and was incapable of rendering an
opinion as to whether Derek's medical condition required d CT scan at the point it was
ordered, Dr. Goldenring seized on PCMC's CTM process to establish the applicable
standard of care. The CTM process, however, has nothing to do with an attending critical
care pediatrician's decision to order a CT scan. In fact, the [attending critical care
pediatrician was aware of the CTM process, but she specifically noted that Derek's care
was outside of the process. Derek's condition presented PQMC with an emergent
situation. The critical care attending pediatrician made the decision to transport Derek
for a CT scan using an FDA-approved transportable ventilator she knew could maintain
the high levels of support of Derek's required. Due to circumstances beyond any
person's contemplation, the medical device failed. The CTlll process is not designed to
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address and indeed does not address Derek's treatment and the attendant medical
decisions that were made to try to provide the best possible medical treatment for Derek.
The trial court properly excluded Dr. Goldenring's opinions from this case and
properly granted all remaining defendants' motions for summary judgment because
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice.
ARGUMENT
I.

The CTM process and guidelines are irrelevant to a determination of whether
the University or PCMC breached the applicable standards of care in
treating Derek.
The undisputed testimony establishes that the Dr. Witte ordered the use of the

Pulmonetic ventilator outside of the CTM process and based on Derek's acute medical
needs. Dr. Goldenring offered no opinion that using an FDA-approved medical device to
treat an emergeny medical condition is not within the applicable standard of care.
Moreover, Dr. Goldenring lacks the qualifications and factual understanding to establish
that use of the Pulmonetic ventilator outside of the CTM process was a violation of the
applicable standards of care. Finally, Dr. Goldenring cannot establish that PCMC's
medical staff breached the standards of care when they followed the orders of Derek's
attending physician.
Dr. Goldenring had no criticism of the care provided to Derek prior to the time he
was transported for a CT scan. (R. at 843) Dr. Goldenring was critical of the decision to
transport Derek, and his criticism of Dr. Witte's and PCMC's care of Derek can be boiled
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down to two basic premises: (1) the need for the CT scan ^t the time it was ordered did
not outweigh the risks of transporting Derek for the CT sc^n, and (2) it was inappropriate
to use the Pulmonetic ventilator to transport Derek becausd he was a critically ill patient.
In order to understand the first issue, an understanding of Derek's medical condition is
required in order to assess whether Dr. Witte's decision was appropriate under the
standard of care for a critical care pediatric physician. Thi^ issue is addressed in the
University's brief and is incorporated by reference into thisl brief.
The second issue is directly applicable to Dr. Goldeijring's opinion on whether
PCMC breached the applicable standard of care. Dr. Goldqnring breaks the second issue
down into two parts: (a) whether the hospital breached a stdndard of care in allowing a
physician and its staff to deviate from its CTM process, and (b) whether PCMC's staff
breached the standard of care in failing to object to Dr. Wittje's decision to transport
Derek for a CT scan.
Dr. Witte's decision to transport Derek was outside t^ie CTM process. (R. at 792)
When asked about whether her decision to use the ventilatoit conformed with the protocol
for the CTM process, Dr. Witte stated: "It was not being ustd in order to evaluate the
ventilator, so I did not consider this part of the ventilator evaluation." (R. at 792) When
pressed further about whether her decision conformed to the| guidelines established for
the CTM process, Dr. Witte reiterated: "This was - and I m^de this clear to everyone
involved. We were not evaluating the ventilator. I saw the fact that this child needed to
go to CT scan, and this ventilator, I had access to it. I was u^ing this ventilator to give
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me information to help me treat this patient, and it was not in any way an evaluation of
the ventilator.... So I viewed this as an FDA approved piece of medical equipment that
was going to help me get information I needed to treat the patient rather than and
completely separate from a clinical evaluation of the ventilator." (R. at 792)
Dr. Witte's testimony established that she viewed the necessity of the CT scan as
critical. Dr. Witte's testimony established that the only means of which she was aware to
transport Derek for a CT scan was to use the Pulmonetic ventilator. Accordingly, Dr.
Witte ordered the CT scan and ordered the Pulmonetic ventilator to be used in order to
transport Derek. Dr. Witte took full responsibility for this decision. Dr. Witte's decision
was based on Derek's medical needs, and it was not part of the evaluation of the
Pulmonetic ventilator.
Dr. Goldenring praised the care Derek received at PCMC prior to being
transported for a CT scan, and his criticism of PCMC s staff was that the nurse and
respiratory therapists did not object to Dr. Witte's decision to use the Pulmonetic
ventilator. Dr. Goldenring's testimony, however, demonstrates that he has no factual
basis to render an opinion that PCMC or its staff violated the applicable standards of
care:
Q: I believe we just talked about Dr. Witte's decision to use
the LTV 1000 on this particular patient and that it was her
decision and order to do so. Correct?
Dr. Goldenring: Yes. And she says that it was her decision.
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il. . me \ et you are critical <>i the respiratory care team and
the staff a1 V~;-".»rv Childress for consenting to that order.

J** Goldenring: Actually, ! don't think that's what I said.
i he care learn tends to defer to the leader. 1 don't know
••i.'her the people w\ux because 1 didn ! look at this,
honest'
•** heino the people who were on that day had been
involved in all these decisions,
hink the attending
physician has a responsibility to know the protocols and to
know if it's been discussed. It's always the attending
physician who ha^ to order ^ Nobod\ ehe earn That's the
rules. So she took responsibility for thai
.» .. .< breach of the applicable NKM- Mrespiratory team to follow Hut order:
III", (luldi
i" I hat's an interesting question, because if
they truly knew and had been involved in the process, they
really should have questioned whether this wals an appropriate
patient. I don't know. And I haven't seen anything in the
depositions that really addresses that question, and so I'm nof
sure how to answer that question because I doti't know a
number nT f-i. K

(R. at 10S7-SXH Emphasis added )
Dr. Goldenring acknowledged that Dr. Witte was the lonly person who could order
T.

'

•

*reover. I )•, * .okiennng testified the staff at PCMC would

"defer" to the attending nhvsician's decisions

Nonetheless. I)i <inldcnnn^1 is t, ii(u\al of

PCMC's staff for not objecting I P: Wttte's decision.
D« Goldenring, however, did not know if PCMC had, any | • lh h^ that phii hul J i
critically ill patient, hke Derek, from being transported with the Pulmonetic ventilator.
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(R. at 1054-55) Dr. Goldenring was unaware if the PCMC staff on duty at the time of the
transport was involved in formulating or knowledgeable about any policies concerning
transporting critically ill children. (R. at 1057-58). Accordingly, Dr. Goldenring
conceded he did not know if the PCMC staff had breached the applicable standard of care
because he was unaware of the facts that were necessary to formulate this opinion.
If this Court determines that Dr. Witte's decision to use the Pulmonetic ventilator
was outside of the CTM process, Dr. Goldenring's opinions fail, as they are tied to his
belief that Dr. Witte and PCMC breached the standard of care because they did not
follow the CTM process and its guidelines. Accordingly, the Court would not need to
consider the remaining arguments under Rule 702(a) & (b).
II.

Dr. Goldenring lacked sufficient qualifications to establish the applicable
standard of care for PCMC and its staff.
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court formally adopted the rule followed in the

majority of states which provides: "a practitioner of one school of medicine is not
competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner of another
school." Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). As set forth in Burton,
"an expert belonging to one school may competently testify against a member of another
school once sufficient foundation has been laid to show that the method of treatment and hence the standard of care - is common to both schools." Id.
In Burton, plaintiff designated an ocular plastic surgeon to testify regarding the
standard of care for a general plastic surgeon who performed ocular surgery on the
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plaintiff. Because the plaintiff s expert had more skill and'experience than the defendant
had, the plaintiff argued her surgeoi 1 cc i ild establish tl le stai idai (I of' :are for b : tl 1
snrpcons. The dial court, however, required the plaintiffs expert to lay adequate
lu'timiiidoti thai llu; simie slandaid of care was applicable 10 aii plastic surgeons who
performed ocular surgery or that a suroe*

rr i

to have the same level of skill and expertise before performing the surgei;. . . ^
• . i-r* - J \ : v

. a.. 10 the stanUuM. w'care applicable to all plastic

surgeons regardless oi &kiii. mub, the trial i ouil d e l u d e d llu r Liiii(i(f s expetl .SV» ,,/
at 248-49.
Under Burton, the mere fact that an expert witness n;iay h a w mniv si"ill
experience, or training does not mean thai i more skilled expert can testify as to any
stnmlnid of n t i r

.IMDIU'HMI

In huillh u i n : fnovidcii".

:-o tnay p o s s e s s a l o w e r icscl w

• i-!.. experieiKv. or (raining. In other words, a doctor ^annpi n c i v ^ r *
appii^aolc standard nf care for a nurse, As Burton requires, an expert must be able to
den 101 isti ate a stai idai d of cat c is coi i it. i ion t 3 both schc c Is of i i ledicine.
,• earb aitei isiu <i/.,. <m ^ < »i.<\ clarified that not only must an expert be able
to testify as to the applicable standard of care, but Ibe evper! mii^l W .iMi lu esl.ihlnli Ibc
applicable standard o( care m rough the expert's own knowledge, training, and
. V M !<•••;.
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Jcrun,.^.

the plaintiff designated an expci

:

, . .. ^ ) . -. i U t a h C t App. 199^"

i ni-. - s »

T

Dikeoi i,

n i i: le dicii le to testify at oi it tl i- :

standard of care for a cardiologist. See id. ai 946. After reviewing medical records and

deposition transcripts, plaintiffs expert stated he had formed an opinion about the
applicable standard of care and whether defendant had adhered to the standard. See id. at
947. This Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of plaintiff s expert stating: "a trial
court should require a medical expert witness to demonstrate familiarity with the
applicable standard of care based on more than just a review of the documents in a
particular case." Id. This Court went on to state: "By definition, an expert is one who
possesses a significant depth and breadth of knowledge on a given subject. To allow a
doctor in one specialty, retained as an expert witness, to become an 'expert' on the
standard of care in a different medical specialty by merely reading and studying the
documents in a given case invites confusion, error, and a trial fraught with unreliable
testimony." Id. Accordingly, an expert's opinions must be based on the expert's
knowledge, skill, and training rather than a review of the case and later formulation of an
opinion. In other words, an expert's review of the case is to determine whether a
standard of care was breached based on the expert's pre-existing knowledge of the proper
standard of care.
In Boice v. Marble, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the exception that allowed
an expert to establish the standard of care was the same, regardless of the school of
medicine. See id., 1999 UT 71,1ffll4-l7, 982 P.2d 565. In Boice, plaintiff designated an
neurosurgeon to establish the standard of care for post-operative treatment of a patient
who underwent spinal surgery. The plaintiffs expert testified that the standard of care
for a patient in post-operative rehabilitation for spinal surgery is the same, regardless of
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whether the attending pli\ siunii is a neurologist, orthopedist, or physiatrist. See id. at
TJ15, Thus, plaintiffs neurosurgeon was able (o establish (lie standard of i arc U >i a
phvMairist with respect to post-operative care. On the other hand, the Court affirmed the
;a\ uiiced-practice registered nurse who specialized in
*/i .-.'jiLtative care from tesiilvipo about tb- •- •
post-operative care

T:

s

.

,les

t

Sec id ai *

nder Boic c. the Court will allow an expert from one set

-

J

i

standaid u! care lor another school if the expert can lay an Adequate foundation lor the
opinions, rypieally the foundation h'ljmtul In invoke the exception - d require the
expert to have practiced in the school of medicine for at leas,! a po • •
See, e.g., Patey v. Lainhart,

i. pi <u I n \

1999 UT 1 1 , ^[18, 977 P.2d 119$ (general dentist was able to

testify about endndnnlirs w In IT one louilli nl dentisl s practice was endodontics and
expert had substantial education in endodontics).

Mr. V j m c n tailed v

*

•

, »•

:

*\

a u e n n n g a s an

expert regarding the standard of care applicable to PCMC. Although Dr (iuldninnt' had
i • i - -••••^v ••:- ••

;>

...^u.viiiv \w\\\

demonstrates that lie was not qualified t» "
to I*. \ l i

iMOs and IPAs,j his deposition testimony
r

ivj-anlmj. the slantlaid el care applicable

in this matter. (R. at 1049)

Dr. Goldenrmg was not qualified to testify renai'dino I lie slandatd ol caiv
applicable to POvl( 1 , s administration of its clinical assessments of medical devices. Dr.
Goldenring had in M hi en in\ \ »l\ K d \\\ establishing protocols for clinical evaluations or
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testing hospital equipment. (R. at 1052) His administrative role in hospitals was limited
to working with physicians to maintain contracts and evaluating a hospital's compliance
with HMO or IPA standards. Because of Dr. Goldenring's lack of expertise in performing
clinical evaluations, the trial court was correct in refusing to permit him to testify as to
the standard of care applicable to PCMC.
Dr. Goldenring was not qualified to testify regarding the standard of care
applicable to PCMC because he was unfamiliar with the standard of care applicable to
critical care physicians, respiratory therapists, and nurses. Dr. Goldenring admitted that
he would defer to these individuals regarding those issues which were the most critical to
Derek's care. (R. at 1034, 1048, 1059-60) As such, Dr. Goldenring cannot criticize
PCMC for deferring the care and treatment of Derek, a patient in critical condition, to the
skill and judgment of its critical care staff. Dr. Goldenring's reliance on PCMC's CTM
process to establish the applicable standards of care in this case is similar to the opinions
that this Court excluded in Dikeou. In Dikeou, this Court required the expert to possess
familiarity with the standard of care based on his own knowledge, experience, and
training. This Court precluded expert testimony based on a review of materials in the
case. Dr. Goldenring admitted that he is unfamiliar with the standard of care for PCMC's
PICU nurses and its respiratory team, Nonetheless, Dr. Goldenring opined that PCMC
breached the standard of care based on his review of the CTM process and deposition
testimony discussing the CTM process. As required by Dikeou, Dr. Goldenring must
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possess
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mh-itl I nn\k;iigc about the appli^aDK .>Lwidard ol care, It is not

sufficient to form an opinion based on review of :in ir»vle\ itm ('' M p» * icess.
iiiilhcuviniv, I if'ih I \w ivcngni/es thai III i1 iiiipniipci" l<>i a third pari) lo interlere
patienl-'ph* sician relationship. In Schaerrer v. Stewart^ Plaza Pharmacy, d ni*.! im i
brougni aciiu.i j^aiUM a pharmacy that filled prescriptions for one-a-day fen-pheiL a
presenutv '

'

,

..
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.iii

Supreme Cou*j ^ *•>: Hiai the pharmacist did not have a duty to warn of the risks
a-

u.a^u A i ,. prcbcnpuon drugs and, thereby, intervene in the physician-patient

relationship /

r ** "

n'cogni/eii lhal il r* ibe treating "physician who is

best situated to neigh the potential risks associated with [treatment] . . . atan

'J

l

possible bciiclils ol | treatment] . .. and the unique needs artd susceptibilities of each
patient. I he physician lliii'i Li i llic abihh In umtluii* malkal knowledge ana ...ntiing
with an individualized understanding of the patient's needs." Id at ^J2r. iiic St hac- i
ii nil I also recognized that n .. *uu\ is placed upon another entity or individual 'o interfere
with the physician -paiinil ivl ilmiblnp \\ vHtmld " turn 11K eileci ol undermining the
physician-patient relationship by engendering fear, doubt, and second guessini
-. * o\\.

/;,/; l ,7uiw/ ( Mu-icii /wc.,584 Aid

A,

1383,'1386 (Pa. *QC^]

Similarly, this Court should not recognize a duty thatj requires PCMC and its staff
to iiileilen; w illi pliysiciitn-palienl relationship
regarding Derek's care and treatment to Dr. Witir

! • *.1C proper!) deferred the decisions
--i.nilii :d ni'iiii :il i .in: pli\ >icKni .111cJ

should not be expected to interfere or undermine that relationship. •
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Mr. Nguyen attempts to argue around Dr. Goldenring's lack of qualifications
regarding Dr. Witte and PCMC's staff by arguing that all defendants breached the
standard of care for a multi-disciplinary health care team. Specifically, Mr. Nguyen
argued that Dr. Goldenring was not offering opinions about standards exclusive to any
one health care specialty, but applicable to all members of a multi-disciplinary PICU
health-care team.
Utah law, however, does not allow expert witnesses to lump specialties into one
group in order to establish a one-size-fits-all standard of care. Moreover, the practice of
medicine is not a democracy. As Dr. Witte candidly admitted, she was Derek's attending
physician and had ultimate responsibility for her care. The other members of the multidisciplinary health care team followed Dr. Witte's instructions. Accordingly, in order to
opine as to the standard of care applicable to a particular health care provider, Dr.
Goldenring must have been familiar with the standard of care applicable to each
particular health care provider. See, e.g., Boice v. Marble, 982 P.2d at 570; Diekeou v.
Osborn, 881 P.2d at 946; Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'I Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193 (Utah
1990).
Dr. Goldenring however, conceded that he was unfamiliar with the standard of
care applicable to respiratory care therapists, nurses, and hospital administrators. In fact,
he deferred to qualified respiratory care therapists and nurses to define the standard of
care applicable to each of those specialties. Dr. Goldenring could not overcome his
apparent lack of knowledge about each of these specialties by asserting that, as a general
24
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uiiaicl>' twenty years ago "in a team context with plenty of
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consultants, including intensivists . . ." (R. at I (MS i \«'< onJi!ti»I\, llir-- »' . l*)||i1 '-Imiild
npi.wiu ilw UtJ court's decision to strike Dr. Ciokicarm J a^ an expert witness because
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:..,; . . ::. vjuaaiivu to opine as to the standard of care

applicable to PCMC administration, p c M C resnir.r ..

- . . ,. : .
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through "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" as required b> Rule /Gz, ol
the Utah Rulr

u r , Croldenring's testimony is not based on sufficient facts and will not assist
the trier of facts,
i h\ \ ioldenring's testimony would nut jssisi Hit- Inn nil UnA

IKUIU.SC

In.s testimony

is not reliably grounded in fact. "Evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a n u ^

<

law, assisl tltr Inn oi* \)w\ U - IIIKICIstand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue
ami. therefore, K inadmissible." Haupt v Il\u

•

*
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. \- ^(uutin g ;,H/fr v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397 -398 (Utah 1989)).
Dr Gokiennng testified that PCMC breached me appucinn: stnndatd ol v .tic I1,,
mil iullon nig us own protocols, policies, and procedures when 1): Witte used the
Pulmonetic ventilat =

i

< '-

MUHI'IL^.

nowever, testified that he did

not review PCMC \s policies and i annol identify an1* written p»-ivu , m prnu/duii: - th
PCKH "' (ailed to lollou. <K at I0:>4-57) In fact, the evidence establishes that PCMC
j
followed its policies anu \
• > •»
loneritic ventilator to Ramsey
Worman for certification prior u> using it on uii> patient n- '
K

•

-

* !.

M2*# i, I "itt)Mi,,l I o I , I 11 As such, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision to
25

strike Dr. Goldenring's testimony because it would not assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to reach a finding of facts at issue.
In addition to failing to understand or review PCMC's policies, which formed the
basis for his standard of care opinion, Dr. Goldenring had no understanding of Derek's
actual medical condition, the trend of Derek's condition while he was at PCMC under Dr.
Witte's care, or even the medical factors that ultimately led Dr. Witte to order a CT scan.
Without this basic understanding of hospital policies, the medical issues involved, and
Derek's medical condition, Dr. Goldenring lack the requisite factual understanding in
which to offer any opinion that would assist the trier of fact in its determination of
whether a breach of the standard of care had occurred.
Specifically, Dr. Goldenring had no criticism of the care provided to Derek prior
to the decision to transport him for a CT Scan. (R. at 843, 848) Dr. Goldenring admitted
to not reviewing the medical records regarding Derek's intracranial pressures (ICP) (R. at
843-44, 853); his cerebral perfusion pressure (CPP) (R. at 846-47, 853); or any
coagulation problems (R. at 847). In addition, Dr. Goldenring lacked a complete
understanding of the treatment provided to Derek prior to being transported for the CT
scan. (R. at 843, 847) Dr. Goldenring understood that Derek required high levels of
ventilation, but he was unaware of the specifics of the ventilator settings or Derek's level
of oxygen saturation. (R. at 844) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Dr. Goldenring
was not aware of Derek's condition before transport or whether Derek's condition was
declining or improving. (R. at 844, 847-48)
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testified that in managing a critically ill patient, the attending critical care physician is
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deteriorating condition imposed, and why the CT scan was ordnvd Di (inldem mtn
lacked a laclnal lust* to render an opinion regarding the care rendered by Dr. Witte,
PCMC, or PCMC's staff.
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The CTM process was completely irrelevant to the decision to transport Derek for
a CT scan. Derek was critically ill, and his condition was deteriorating. Absent some
improvement, Derek was going to die. Dr. Goldenring admitted that he was ignorant of
each of these critical factors, so he used an irrelevant product evaluation protocol to opine
that Dr. Witte, PCMC, and PCMCs staff breached the applicable standard of care. Dr.
Goldenring's testimony is the definition of unreliable, speculative testimony that Rule
702 is designed to preclude.
IV.

PCMC owed no duty to obtain informed consent from Mr. Nguyen.
The trial court properly dismissed Mr. Nguyen's claim for failure to obtain

informed consent. A claim for lack of informed consent is grounded in negligence
principles. See Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d. 188, 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To state a
claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish "(1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries
or damages." Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, ^[9, 125 P.3d 906 (citation
omitted). Therefore, in order to maintain a cause of action for lack of informed consent, a
plaintiff is required to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care to
obtain informed consent.
The determination of whether a legal duty exists is a purely legal question that
falls to the court. See Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283. The
vast majority of courts refuse to impose a duty to obtain informed consent upon a
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In Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co . a non omplouv physician oulered that the
hospital nurses give the patient a blood transfusion. See id, 832 P.2d at 798. The patienl
later developed henahir v, In. h, WA,^ H.H ill to the Dlood transtlision... The patient's estate
sued the hospital for failure to obtain informed conscnl |» M M l< I gi\ my die blood
.' h. --i. .\ .

.he trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a

claim for which relief could ("» .t'juiikil against the hospital.. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding Ihiil Ihe hospilal did nni ha\'c duty to
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In refusing to place a duty to

obtain informed consent on. the hospital, the court ddcntiMici! Unit iillendiny physicians
are i i lore qualified than hospital staff to obtain informed consent. The court's ruling,
thereby, protected the physieiim-patient relahoirdup I mm unnecessary third-party
interference.
rhe Utah Supreme Couu i

le physician-patient

relationship from third-party interference. InSchaerrer v. Stewart's Plara Phaniuicw
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Inc., the plaintiff experienced nausea, chest pains, and dizziness after taking an off-label
prescription of fenfloramine and phentermine (or "fen-phen") for weight loss, as
prescribed by her treating physician. Plaintiff filed a complaint against several
defendants including her pharmacist claiming strict products liability. The trial court
dismissed plaintiffs claims on motions for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and specifically held that
pharmacists are exempt from strict products liability for failure to warn of the risks of
prescription drugs. Id. at ^[20-21. Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the court
held that
The physician is the best situated to weigh the potential risks
associated with a prescription drug against the possible
benefits of the drug and the unique needs of the patient. The
physician thus has the ability to combine medical knowledge
and training with an individualized understanding of the
patient's needs, and is the best conduit for any warnings that
are deemed necessary.
Id, at f21 (citations omitted). The court also recognized that if the court placed a duty
upon pharmacists to warn patients of the potential risks of prescription drugs it would
"have the effect of undermining the physician-patient relationship by engendering fear,
doubt, and second-guessing.... Physicians are health care specialists trained to act as
'exclusive intermediaries' in the drug distribution system." Id. at f21 (citations omitted).
Similarly, this Court should follow the precedent set by the Utah Supreme Court
and the majority of courts to protect the physician-patient relationship by recognizing that
PCMC had no duty to obtain informed consent for treatment prescribed by non-employee
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The trial court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages.
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Disti ess.
A plainffff alleging mli'uiion.ii nidiction ot emotional distress must establish
facts on the record showing the defendant's alh-r*
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Schuurman, 2001 IJT 52 at ^24.
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in wi ^motional distress, it is

not enough for a plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally
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causes distress, defendant's conduct must also be "outrageous." Id. atf25. Plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant:
(1) intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff
considered outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality, (2)
with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where any
reasonable person would have known that such would result,
and (3) that severe emotional distress resulted as a direct
result of the defendant's conduct.
Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992) (citations
omitted).
Dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is proper if
"the alleged conduct of the defendant does not rise to the level of outrageousness as
required under Utah law." Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 801 (D.
Utah 1988). It is the court's duty to decide "'whether the defendants' conduct may
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.'"
Schuurman, 2001 UT 52 at ^24 (quoting Gygi v. Storch, 503 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah 1972),

also quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1948)).
According to the Utah Supreme Court, for conduct to be considered outrageous,
c

"[t]he conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable,

unkind, or unfair.' ... 'An act is not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortuous,
injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is
illegal.'" Franco, 2001 UT 25 at f25 (quoting 86 C.J.S. Torts § 72, at 722-23); see also
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->65). Furthermore. '"T^he km only

\ CIKN where the distress inilieled ib

^ ^

. •-•: could be

expected to endure it' and that T " k nn :he conn io determine whether, on the evidence
sevc". <*

s :

;»

.,jnuurman, _»)Ol UT 52 at f24,

(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR I'S $ 40 • ml i (I'M N 11.

Under Utah law, .i phii'iiitl itiiisi establish outrageous conduct and severe
emotional distress. In Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 461 -

•

-

*• i

plaint il I "«. husband was buried under 40 tons of ore while doing some repair work in a
-»^ AVL\C\ C averts5 body, Kennecott

"feeder comp -" **•

activated the conveyor which moves ore through the conipafiiiH • • •' •*
>.-'• ; •

- madiiiiery was started and Mr. Co\ ert was extracted from the oiv in

that fashion. See id. nt 468 Tin IMmnliir ".UK upsil lli.il kennecott would further
mutilate the deceased's body in this manner. See id. at 467. Ihr n "'"I

IM ' dismissed 'In

plaintiffs claim for emotional distress, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at
)7u.
..;.-•

. N . -J 1 ^82 (Utali Ct. App. 1995), the plaintiff

claimed intentional inllietion of emotional ' ^ . ^

. tiir t his emplos ci, alleging that the

a, i . . u^noiing him, terminating him, and requiring him to discuss his drug adJ*
with his •lUhnrdinaU''. caused Imii u» sutler extreme humiliation and anxiety. Affirming
summary judgment for the defendant, m

I

:

e\ ery employee

who believes he has a legitimate grievance concerning his discharge from empK
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experiences some emotional anguish as a result of that belief... .The mere fact that
Robertson was discharged, coupled with the fact that he was purportedly required to
discuss his drug addiction with his subordinates, does not rise to the level of
outrageousness or intolerable conduct necessary to establish a prima facie claim of
emotional distress." Id. at 1389.
In Schuurman v. Shingleton, a former patient brought an action against her
psychotherapist for medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See id,, 2001 UT 52 at ^3. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant carried on a "dual
relationship" with the plaintiff consisting of a therapist-patient relationship and a personal
relationship. See id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant manipulated and controlled
the plaintiff by making false promises of marriage and financial security. See id. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's actions ultimately destroyed the plaintiffs marriage,
caused her not to seek proper treatment for her eating disorder and depression, and
caused severe pain, suffering, and emotional distress. See id. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress because "[hjowever unpleasant, the emotional
distress that plaintiff alleges she suffered is indistinguishable from that commonly
suffered by others when an intimate personal relationship fails. As such, it is not the type
of emotional distress on which a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress may
be based." See id., at ^[24.
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These cases held as a matter of law that actions such as mutilating a dead body,
violating a psychotherapist-patient relationship, demoting ^n employee and discrediting
his reputation, and failing to provide informed consent before treating a patient with
experimental drugs were not "outrageous" as required for i claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Schuurman case show$ that evidence of depression,
eating disorders, pain, suffering, and distress are not the type ot emotional distress on
which a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can be based.
In this case, the facts alleged against PCMC even ^hen viewed in a light most
favorable to Mr. Nguyen. PCMC's alleged intentional conduct did not meet the standard
of "outrageous" conduct required by Utah law to sustain a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Mr. Nguyen alleged that PCMC "failed to properly inspect, test,
and/or certify the Pulmonetics ventilator prior to its use," "decided to use its critically-ill
patients, or allow others to use the critically-ill patients at its medical center, to test
and/or demonstrate a Pulmonetics ventilator," and failed to lhlorm him of either of these
facts. The trial court correctly concluded that this alleged conduct is not sufficiently
outrageous to sustain the claim for intentional infliction of erhotional distress, especially
considering that the Pulmonetics ventilator is FDA approved land that Dr. Witte's use of
the ventilator was not a part of the hospital's clinical evaluatibn of the ventilator. In fact,
Mr. Nguyen could not produce any evidence to show that anc^ defendants' intent was to
cause him emotional distress as opposed to an intent only to s^ve Derek's life.
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b. Punitive Damages.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on Mr. Nguyen's claims for
punitive damages. Punitive damages may only be awarded against PCMC upon a
showing (1) by clear and convincing evidence (2) that PCMC engaged in fraudulent
conduct that was either "willful and malicious" or conduct manifesting both a "knowing
and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-18-l(l)(a). Both the plain language of the Punitive Damages Act and its legislative
history make clear that punitive damages are available in Utah only in exceptional cases
involving culpable conduct on the part of the alleged tortfeasor—and then only upon a
finding supported by clear and convincing evidence. See id. In addition, case law on
punitive damages in Utah, both prior and subsequent to the enactment of the Punitive
Damages Act, permits and award of punitive damages only where such an award serves a
societal interest in deterring outrageous and malicious conduct that is not likely to be
deterred by an other means.
The Act's combined requirements of a high degree of wrongful conduct and
knowledge by a tortfeasor of the wrongful and harmful nature of such conduct were
specifically crafted to reflect the Utah legislature's belief that only truly culpable conduct
should be punished. The Legislature drafted the Act in plain terms to make clear that
even reckless conduct, by itself, does not warrant the imposition of punitive damages.
Because only truly culpable conduct should be punished, knowing conduct is required.
See Kia Hodgson, Recent Developments in Utah—Punitive Damages Act, 1990 Utah L.
Rev. 119, 273 (citing remarks by Senator Haven J. Barlow, 48th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess.,
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Feb.l, 1989 (Sen. Recording No. 43), and Feb. 2, 1989 (Sen. Recording No. 45)). Utah
appellate courts have also repeatedly cautioned that "punitive damages are not intended
as additional compensation to a plaintiff [and] must, if awarded, serve a societal interest
of punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious condUct which is not likely to be
deterred by other means." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah
1983)).
"Simple negligence will never suffice as a basis upon which [punitive] damages
may be awarded." Id. at 1186. Accordingly, '"[p]unitive datoages are not awarded for
mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like, wnich constitute ordinary
negligence.'" Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 908 Comment b, at 465
(1979)); see also Boyette v. L. W. Looney & Son, 932 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Utah 1996)
(holding award of punitive damages may not be based solely upon finding of ordinary
negligence). In addition, notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition and failure to act,
absent more, does not support a claim for punitive damages lender Utah's punitive
damages statute. See Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., 960 F. SUpp. 1522, 1531 (D. Utah
1994). A defendant (1) "must either know or should know 'that such conduct would, in a
high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another,' and [(2)] the conduct
must be 'highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a
situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.'" Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1187
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Finally, in order to limit the availability of punitive damages and to ensure that
such damages are awarded only in rare and exceptional instances of particularly
egregious conduct, the Utah Legislature raised the required burden of proof. Any
punitive damages award must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, rather than
a preponderance of the evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(l)(a). Accordingly,
when evaluating a dispositive pre-trial motion and considering whether genuine issues of
material fact exist, a trial court must apply the standard of proof that would be used for
each element of the claim. See Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262,
264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994). In other words, when a party is required to prove a claim by clear and
convincing evidence at trial, the reviewing court must consider the claim under the clear
and convincing evidence standard. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800
(Utah 1991).
Mr. Nguyen could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the requirements for an award
of punitive damages against PCMC under any evidentiary standard, much less under a
clear and convincing evidentiary standard. No record evidence exists that PCMC acted
willfully and maliciously in an intentionally fraudulent manner or with knowing and
reckless disregard for his rights or the well-being of his son. The record does not support
that PCMC or its employees acted willfully, maliciously, knowingly, recklessly, or in an
intentionally fraudulent manner in treating Derek or advising Mr. Nguyen about Derek's
treatment.
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CONCLUSION
PCMC respectfully requests this Court to affirm t|ie trial court's ruling on the
motion to strike Mr. Nguyen's expert and on its motion foil summary judgment. Mr.
Nguyen has not provided reliable expert testimony to establish that PCMC or its staff
breached the standard of care owed to Derek.
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day of April, 2009.
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